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Abstra ct

The paper discuss es recent trends in age at marriag e for women
in Malays ia and Japan.

Age at marriag e is hypoth esized to respond signif i

cantly to changes in male and female wage rates, schooli ng, unearne d
wealth ,
and family backgro und.

Using househ old data from Malays ia and Japan, age

at marriag e is regress ed on these socioec onomic variabl es and an exogeno
us
time trend variab le.

We find consid erable suppor t for the relevan ce of

econom ic variab les and family backgro und on age at marriag e as well
as
evidenc e of a strong exogeno us positiv e trend over time in age at marriag
e
in both countr ies.
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Age at marri age is one of the most impor tant life-c ycle
decis ions that
men and women in all cultu res face.

Where pre-m arital sexua l relati onshi ps

are taboo or infreq uent, marri age-- or socia lly
sanct ioned cohab itatio n--sig nifies

the begin ning of a woma n's expos ure to pregn ancy risk;
chang es in nupti ality
patte rns are often assoc iated with chang es in popul ation
growt h.

In most

coun tries, marri age patte rns have been chang ing quite
marke dly over the last
thirty years ; in gener al, a downward trend in the perce
ntage of the popul ation
marri ed at every age and an upwar d trend in age at marri
age have been disce rned.
In Asia, for examp le, Malay sia and Japan exper ience d
signi fican t chang es in
_both age at marri age and the propo rtion of women evermarri ed. The 1966
and 1974 ~alay sia Ferti lity and Famil y Surve ys (MFFS)
prese nt striki ng dif
feren ces in age at marri age patte rns.

The mean age at marri age rose from

16.6 to 17.9 for the cohor t of 15-24 year old marri ed
women, from 17.8 to
19.5 for the cohor t of 25-34 year old women, and from
17.5 to 18.8 for the
cohor t of 35-44 year old women.

Comparing Censu s data and the Ferti lity

Surve y from 1947 to 1974, clear declin es in propo rtions
of women ever-m arried
or curre ntly marri ed are indic ated in every age group
.
data.

Table l prese nts these

Table 2 prese nts compa rable inform ation for Japan .

In Japan as in

Malay sia, the propo rtion marry ing has declin ed for the
young er cohor ts of
women.

For the young est cohor t, 15-19 years old, the perce ntage
ever marri ed

has fallen from 3.4 in 1940 to 1.4 in 1975.
has dropp ed from 45 in 1940 to 31 in 1975.

For women 20 to 25~ this perce ntage
The chang e is much less signi fican t

in the older cohor ts, with a declin e from 85 perce nt
25-29 year

olds ever- marri ed durin g this perio d.

to 79 perce nt of all

Also, in contr ast with

Malay sia, the propo rtion ever-m arryin g by age 39 has
chang ed very little ;
the shift in Japan is chara cteriz ed by a chang e in the
timin g of marri age
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rather than the choice to ever-marry.

Although the proportion of women 25-29

who are ever married is the same in both countries, there are marked differences
between the countries, in the fractions of younger women married.

Eight times

as many Malaysian women 15-19 and nearly twice as many Malaysian women 20-25
are married relative to their counterparts in Japan.

One would not be surprised

then to find that the mean age at marriage for all women marrying in 1977 in
Japan is 25. (increasing from 24 in 1970) while the mean age at marriage for
all women in Malaysia in 1974 is 18.
Two approaches commonly explain these marriage patterns.
the

The first

demographic approach--isola tes a trend line in the data, and mathematically

fits marriage patterns to a "standard" curve (Coale, 1971).

This approach

assigns little role to changing socioeconomic conditions in determining age
at marriage and the proportion ever-married.

The second approach--the be

havioral approach--emph asizes the role of socioeconomic conditions in explaining
the observed behavior, while virtually ignoring historical trends in the data.
Hogan (1978), Keeley (1977, 1979), and Becker (1973, 1974) have contributed
significantly· to this approach by offering alternative explanations of marriage
behavior.
Hogan analyzes data on United States males.

His results reject the

theory that characteristics of the family of origin (family structure, father's
education and income)·are important determinants of age at marriage.
find that age at marriage is significantly related

to

He does

participation in time

intensive activities such as the military, college, and the labor force.

Cohort

and race variables are also important in measuring differences in marriage.
Hogan fails, however, to adequately specify a model which explains why these

TABLE 1.

EVER-MARRIED AND CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AS A PROPORTION OF ALL WOMEN, BY FIVE-YEAR AGE GROUPS:
MALAYSIA, 1947-1975
(percent)

Current
Age

EverMarried

Currently
Married

EverMarried

1947
Census

19~7
Census

1970
Census

MFFS
1974

Currently
Married

EverMarried

Currently
Married

EverMarried

Currently
Married
w

15-19

11

10

16

15

37

35

42

38

20-24

50

48

57

55

79

75

87

19

25-29

79

76

86

83

94

90

96

88

30-34

90

85

94

90

98

91

98

87

35-39

94

82

98

86

99

81

98

77

Source:

Malaysian Fertility and Family Survey - 1974:

First Country Report, 1977.
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TABLE 2.

EVER-MARRIED AND CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AS A PROPORTION OF
ALL WOMEN, BY FIVE-YEAR AGE GROUPS: 1950-1975
(percent)

1975
Current Age EverGroup
Married

1960

Currently
Married

EverMarried

1950
Currently
Married

EverMarried

1940
EverMarried

15-19

1.4

1.3

2.1

1.8

1.3

3.4

20-24

31

31

28

28

32

45

25-29

79

78

82

80

79

85

30-34

92

90

93

90

90

94

35-39

95

91

94

90

94

97

Source:

The Population Census of Japan,1940, 1950, 1960, and 1975.
Prime Minister's Office. Bureau of Statistics.

Japan.
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variables are important to the marriage decision, and his estimation procedure
is ad hoc for this reason.

In addition, Hogan's conclusion that family back

gronnd can be ignored in further analysis is not entirely supported by his
data and is not supported in other cultures.

In his analysis of whites, he

does find that father's participation in the labor force, mother's education,
and farm origin are significant determinants of age at marriage.
The theoretical work by Keeley and Becker views marriage as a choice
variable and can, therefore, offer some insight into why socioeconomic variables
are important in the marriage decision.

Keeley models the process of searching

for a mate, emphasizing the costs of search.

His model predicts that the net

gain to marriage for women will fall and the age at marriage will rise with
increases in the female wage relative to the male wage.

With higher wages,

the cost of searching for a mate increases as more time is devoted to search
rather than to market work.

Search is prolonged and less intensive so that

marriage is delayed.
Becker's theory of marriage predicts that marriage occurs if the
benefits from marriage exceed the costs.

The economic gains accruing to

marriage derive from the production of "household commodities" such as meals,
companionship, and children.

If married households can produce these commodities

at a lower cost than single households, then individuals will choose to marry.
The gains from marriage, therefore, depend on wage and non-wage income when
married and single, the prices of purchased inputs used in the production
of household commodities, and the efficiency of household production.

Becker

does not empirically test his model, but Friedan (1974) does and finds some
support for the importance of economic variables in determining the proportion
of females married.

In particular, if the difference in the male and female

wage rates is large, the proportion of women marrying increases.

In addition,
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an increase in wealth or a technolog ical change in the home results in an
increase in the proportio n of women married.
The Becker model is not a model of the age at marriage but of the
decision to ever marry.

The Becker model was extended to incorpora te the

age at marriage by Anderson and Hill (1980).

In this case, if marital

dissoluti on is rare or remarriag e after divorce is common and preceded by
a short lag, then the fraction of the lifetime married represent s the
probabili ty of ever-marr ying.

Age at marriage is, therefore , a decreasin g

function of the probabili ty of ever-~arr ying; any variables which increase
this probabili ty of marrying decrease the age at marriage and vice versa.
In this paper, we use data from Tokyo, Japan and Peninsula r Malaysia
to estimate the determina nts of age at marriage.

Our approach is based on

the model developed by Anderson and Hill (1980).

Marital dissolutio n is

rare in Japan with fewer than three percent of all married women over thirty
ever divorcing ; the model is appropria te.

In Malaysia, divorce is

unusually

common for an Asian country, but remarriag e after divorce is the norm and
the lag between divorce and remarriag e is short.

(See the Malaysian Fertility

and Family Survey, 1974, for more detailed informati on on marital dissoluti on.)
Although the age at marriage model is less appropria te in this setting, the
speed at which women remarry very likely mitigates any inconsist encies.
We view marriage as a choice variable which we expect to respond
significa ntly to changes in wages, income, and other socioecon omic characte ristics
of the populatio ns.

In particula r, we expect that the wife's wage and the

husband's wage will be positivel y related to her age at marriage.
wife's wage increases , her market earning power increases .

As the

At the same time,
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this change will make time in the home more expensive.

If wives spend

relatively more time in the home than the market compared to single women,
rising wages will result in delayed marriages. An increase in

the husband's

market wage has two effects.

First, it raises the cost of the husband's

time in the home proudction.

This increase will raise the cost of goods

produced with the husband's time, reduce the benefits to marriage, and
consequently increase the age at marriage.

Second, the wage increase

will provide more income to the household.

This effect will lower the

age at marriage since the gains to marriage will rise.

The net effect

of an increase in the husband's wage will depend on the relative strength

of these two effects.
The unearned income of both spouses will also significantly influence
the age at marriage.

If the wife has independent wealth from an inheritance,

for example, her own resources increase, and she may choose to delay marriage.
Conversely, the husband's unearned incone will raise marital income relative
to the income of the single woman and make marriage a more desirable alternative.
Schooling is closely associated with wealth accumulation, tastes, and efficiency
in both the home and in the labor market.
intergenerational transfer of wealth.

Schooling may also represent an

An increase in the wife's or husband's

schooling may raise or lower the age at marriage.

We are also interested in

testing for the pre•. 1::nce of an exogenous trend in age at marriage as hypothesized
by demographers.

The estimating equations incorporate both the relevant socio

economic variables and the trend over time.

Significance of these variables

lends support to both approaches to analyzing changing marriage patterns.
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Data And Methodolo gy
The 1976

The data for this analysis are obtained from two surveys.

Nalaysian Family Life Survey collected by the Rand Corporati on is used for
the Malaysian estimatio n.

The survey includes 1262 household s in Peninsula r

Halaysia, each containin g at least one ever-marr ied woman younger than age

50.

The sample is represent ative of the Malaysian populatio n; thirty-ni ne

percent of the household s are Chinese, 12 percent are Indian, 48 percent are
Malay, and the remaining one percent are of other indigenou s groups.

The

sample used in this study is restricte d to those household s in which
the husband is present.

The Japanese data are drawn from a 1975 survey of

1405 women aged 20 to 29 in the Tokyo Metropoli tan Area.

The data were

collected by the Japanese National Institute for Vocationa l Research and
include informati on on family backgroun d and socioecon omic characte ristics
as well as marital status.
Our estimatio n procedure uses

ordinary least squares regressio ns of

the age at marria;·~~ nf women on socioecon omic variables and an exogenous time
trend.

The socioecon omic variables are the wage rates of the husband and wife,

unearned income, schooling , and family backgroun d characte ristics.
presents the means and standard deviation s of these variables .

Table 3

As expected

from the discussio n of aggregate trends in both countries , the mean age at
marriage in Japan is much higher than in 11alaysia:

24 versus 19.

For the Malysian and Japanese data, the wage rates of the wives and
husbands are imputed from estimatin g equations .

For the husbands and the

working wives, the wage rate is imputed from earnings functions in which the
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TABLE 3.

SAMPLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF AGE AT MARRIAGE, SOCIOECONOMIC, AND FAMILY BACKGROUND VARIABLES:

MALAYSIA AND JAPANa

Malaysia

Japan

18. 7

(4 .02)

23.8
(3 .06)

ln Wife's value of timeb
(Malaysian dollars per hour and yen per hour)

1.51
(0.62)

5.70
(0. 21)

Wife's years of schooling

3.84
(3 .93)

11.24
(2.27)

ln Husband's earnings
(Malaysian dollars per hour and yen per year)

2.29
(0 .57)

14.27
(0. 21)

Husband's years of schooling - Malaysia

5. 71
(4.09)

Age at marriage

Husband's schooling - Japan
(Dummy variable =l if completed junior high school)
Present value of wealth - Malaysia
(Malaysian dollars)

0.72

440.62
(2345 .18)

ln Father's income - Japan
(yen per year)

14.67
(0.24)

Mother's schooling - Japan
(Dwnmy variable =l if completed junior high school)

0.31

Malaysian wife is Chinese
(Dummy =l)

0.38

Malaysian wife is Indian
(Dummy = 1)

0.12

Market center residence - Malaysian
(Dummy = 1)

0.20

Other urban area residence - Malaysian
(Dwnmy = 1)

0.22

Year of marriage

1961

1961

aStandard deviations in parentheses .
bThe 1975 exchange rate was 293.8 yen per dollar in Japan and 2.59 Malay
sian dollars per U.S. dollar.
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log of earnings is regressed on characteristics of the individual reflectinr
the amount of human capital accumulated:

experience, schooling, and for

Malaysie,ethnic and location characteristics. Due to unfortunate differ
ences in the employment status question in the two surveys, we could not
define the labor force in Japan and Malaysia identically.

Therefore, the Ha

laysian labor force is defined to include anyone regularly working for money
or in-kind wages and may comprise women working in family businesses.

For

Japan, the labor force is defined in this study as the formal sector; a
housewife producing home handicrafts is not included in our definition of
the Japanese labor force.

The estimating procedure the the estimating

equations for husbands and working wives are presented in the Appendix.
The wage rates of non-working wives are not imputed from the earnings
functions of working wives.

In Malaysia, 46 percent of the women are not

regular workers; in Japan, 85 percent of the vomen manufacture home handicrafts
or do not work.

It is likely that these p,roups of women are non-randomly

crawn from the sample of all women so that sample censoring is suspected if
vages are imputed from a sample of vorkers only.

We choose to estimate the

value of non-market time for these non-working women separately.

First,

labor force participation is regressed on all variables determining the
value of market time and the value of non-market time:

experience, schooling,

wealth, ethnic characteristics, location, and characteristics of the husband.
From these estimates, the value of non-market time is easily derived.

The

description of this procedure and the results of the estimation are presented
in the Appendix.

The value of time for non-workers is imputed from these

equations.
To measure family background in Malaysia, ve include variables on ethnicity
and urban or rural residency.

The data set includes no data on characteristics

of the wife or husband's family before marriage.

The Japanese data, however,
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provide detailed information on income of the wife's father and schooling of
parents.

The father's income is imputed from an estimating equation given

in the Appendix; income is a function of education and occupation.

The

imputed income of the father and the mother's schooling are included in the
regressions to capture differences in family background.
The schooling variables of the husband and wife are included to measure
the intergenera tional transfer of human capital wealth and the efficiency of
household production.

For Malaysia, the variables are the number of years

of schooling completed by the husband and the wife, with means of 5.7 and 3.8
respectivel y.

Japanese women completed an average of 11.2 years cif schooling.

Actual years of schooling were unavailable for Japanese husbands; a dummy
variable equal to one if hegraduated from junior high school serves as a proxy.
The year of marriage measures the time trend in age at marriage.

The mean

year for both countries is 1961.
Empirical Results
Table 4 presents the empirical results of OLS regressions of age at
marriage in Malaysia using four

specificatio ns of the model.

In the first

regression, the husband's and wife's values of time.are imputed from estimating
equations given in the Appendix.
and wife are also included.
is omitted.

Variables for the schooling of the husband

In the second equation, the wife's schooling

In the third rei:;ression, the imputed wage variables are omitted

because of a possible high correlation between the wage and schooling.

In

the fourth equation, the schooling variables are omitted.
The effect of an increase in the wife's wage on her age at marriage is
negative and significant ; the elasticity evaluated at the mean in regressions
(1) is -.01 and -.008 in regressions (2) and (3).

(The wage elasticity is the

ratio of the percentage change in age to the percentage change in the
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wage.)

Contrary to our expectations, as the value of the wife's t:ime increases,

for example, due to more schooling and labor market experience, she marries earlier.
As the husband's wage, an increase in the wife's wage has two effects.

First,

her wage increase raises the cost of her time spent in home production.

The effect

will tend to increase her age at marriage if she spends more time in the home as
a married woman than as a single woman.
lifetime income.

Second, the wage increase will raise her

This effect will increase the benefits of remaining single and

increase her age at marriage unless her contribution to household income is much
higher when she is married than when she is single.
cally ambiguous.

The net wage effect is theoreti

Our est:imated wage effect is negative, although it is not large;

doubling the value of t:ime decreases the age at marriage by less than one year.
The wife's schooling is also a positive determinant of her age at
marriage.

This variable represents an intergeneration al transfer of human

capital as well as efficiency in production outside of marriage.

The elasticity

of age with respect to schooling evaluated at the sample means is approximately
.02 in regressions (1) and (3).

If schooling wer~ to double from the sample
'

mean of 3.8 years, age at marriage would increase by an average of approximately
eight months.
The husband's wage has a positive effect on the wife's age at marriage.
The elasticity evaluated at the sample mean is .66 in regressions (1) and (2)
and .10 in regression (4).

If schooling is included, a one percent increase

in husband's wage reduces the age at marriage by .66 percent.

The sign of

the coefficient is as expected if the negative substitution effect of an increase
in the value of the husband's time in his household activities outweighs the
gain that his higher purchasing power will bring to marriage.
The husband's schooling is a negative determinant of age at marriage
if the wage variable is included and a positive determinant if it is excluded.
The elasticity in equations (1) and (2) is -.22, and the elasticity in equation

13

TABLE 4.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR AGE AT MARRIAGE IN MALAYSIA
a b
(1025 observations) •

Independent Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Intercept

-.996
(-.389)

-1.319
(-.514)

in Wife's value of time
(imputed)

-.227
(-1.859)

-.147
(-1.231)

Wife's schooling

.102
(2,727)

in husband's hourly wage
(imputed)

12 .116
(3. 359)

11.720
(3,242)

Husband's schooling

- • 749
(-3.063)

-.678
(-2.778)

.064
(1. 968)

-3.536
(-2.386)

.930
(3,230)

.450
(1. 205)

Residence in market
center dummy

-3.760
(-2.541)

7.488
(10. 751)

5.547
(7 .984)
-.149
(-1.243)

.081
(2.217)
1. 742

(4.211)

Residence in ocher
urban area dummy

-4.153
(-2.967)

-3.987
(-2. 843)

.225
(.869)

-.204
(-. 60 5)

Wife of Chinese
origin dummy

-2.458
(-1.569)

-2.320
(1.477)

2. 772
(12,384)

1.968
(6. 704)

Wife of Indian
origin dummy

-1.476
(-2.202)

-1.466
(-2.179)

.449
(1. 376)

.156
(. 46 7)

Year of marriage

.148
(12. 304)

.159
(14.053)

.150
(12,555)

.161
(14. 237)

F - Statistic

72 .26

79 .86

89.76

89. 59

• 38

.38

• 38

.38

R -

Square

a t-s t at1st1cs
·
·
· paren th eses
in
bThe wife's age is set equal to zero in the inputed value of time equiition.
(See DaVanzo, Detray, and Greenberg, 1976).
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(3) is .02.

In the first case, schooling is measuring a wealth and efficiency

effect separate from the wage effect; an increase in the wealth that he
brings to the marriage or his efficiency in household production encourages
an earlier marriage.

In the second case, education is. capturing the effect

of wealth and efficiency as well as the wage effect.
Age at marriage differs according to area of residence and ethnic
background.

Age at marriage is lower in a market center or urban area than

in a rural community and is lower for Chinese and Indian women than for Malay
women, if wages and education are held constant.

If wages are not controlled

for, however, as in equation (3), rural residents and Malays have the lowest
age at marriage, confirming results obtained in the 1974 l1alaysian Fertility
and Family Survey.

Controlling for economic variables is important in in

terpreting the effects of residence and ethnicity.

These results indicate

that age at marriage is lower for Malay and rural women because they have
a lower value of time than non-Malays and urban women.
Finally, the trend variable--y ear of marriage--i s positive and significant .
Age at marriage in Malaysia has been increasing over time, controlling for
changes in wages, wealth, and other socioeconom ic variables.
Table 5 presents the empirical results of OLS regressions for age
at marriage in Japan using four specificatio ns of th~ model.

The wife's and

husband's schooling alternate with their wages as measures of the value of
time.

(The wife's schooling was not included with her wage since the two varia

bles are highly collinear.)

First, the effect of a change in the wife's value

of time, measured as her wage or schoolin~, on age at marriage is positive
and significant --the elasticitie s evaluated at the mean are approximate ly

15

.04 in each regression.

As in Malaysia, as her time becomes more valuabl~

the gains from marriage decrease, and she substitutes time in the market for
time that she would spend working in the household.
Second, when the husband's schooling is included as a regressor, his
This variable is not a predicted wage

income increases the age at marriage.

or value of time but predicted annual earnings and, therefore, includes an
endogenous labor supply effect which cannot be separated from the wage effect.
The effect of a change in the husband's level of schooling on age at marriage
is negative and significant.

The elasticity evaluated at the mean is -.02.

The husband's schooling variable probably captures an efficiency effect as
well as the negative wealth effect.

An increase in his level of schooling,

will raise his efficiency in household production and unambiguously increase
the gains to marriage.
Third, the proxies for the wife's family background--fa ther's income
and mother's schooling--are positive and significant determinants of the age
at marriage; the elasticity of age with respect to mother's schooling and the
elasticity of age with respect to father's income, evaluated at the sample
means, are .005 and .035 respectively.

These results are as expected; the

more wealthy the home environment, the later the age at marriage.
Fourth, the year of marriage is a positive determinant of the age
of marriage.

The trend in age at marriage is significantly upwards if we

control for individual variation in wages and wealth.
The regression samples used in estimating the age at marriage equations
include only those women who are currently married.

We obviously do not kn°'.'
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TABLE 5.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR AGE AT MARRIAGE IN JAPAN
a
(1110 observations)

Intercept

-119. 706
(5.31)

-86.442
(-4.12)

ln Wife's value of time
(imputed)

.908
(1.64)

.745
(1.40)

Wife's schooling
ln Hush and 's Income
(imputed)

.801
(1.28)

Husband's schooling

-1.001
(-3.87)

Mother's schooling

.260
(1.23)

ln Father's Income
(imputed)

(3)

(2)

(1)

Independent Variable

-.369
(<J.66)

(4)

-115.601
(-4.98)

-96.029
(-4.6f:)

.078
(1.59)

.098
(2 .03)

1.060
(1.84)
-1.059
(-4.00)

-.817
(-3.56)

.222
(1.04)

.241
(1.13)

.288
(1.36)

• 843
(2.14)

.850
(2.14)

.832
(2.11)

.919
(2.34)

Year of marriage

.059
(5.89)

.050
(5 .13)

.057
(5.59)

.054
(5.36)

F-statistic

10.26

9.24

10. 23

11.57

R-square

.05

.04

.05

.05

at-statistics in parentheses.
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the age at marriage for never-married women.
married are not

Young women who are currently

a random sample of their cohort.

They have a higher probability

of ever-marrying then their counterparts; their inclusion in the sample may
lead to selectivity bias in our results.

For the Malaysian sample, no

correction for selectivity bias can be performed because only ever-married
women were included in the survey.

For the Japanese sample, however, we can

test for the presence of selectivity bias by analyzing the decision to marry
itself.

The test procedure is outlined in Heckman (1979); we estimate a

logit model of the decision to marry rather than a probit model.
(1979).

(See Hay

Inclusion of the adjustment for selectivity bias results in a

slight decrease in overall significance of the estimates (e.g. the F-statistic
for the first specification in Table 5 drops from 10.26 to 9.35).

The co

efficient for the selection variable is itself insignificant, and the remaining
coefficients change very little.

Since there is virtually no evidence of

selectivity bias, we chose to present the most significant results--those
uncorrected for this bias--and to ignore the sample selection issue.
Conclusions
It is apparent from these regression results that age at marriage in
Japan and Malaysia does respond significantly to changes in socioeconomic
variables and that it has been following an exogenous time trend.

We found

a marked difference in the response of age at marriage to changes in the
value of a woman's time in the two countries.

In Malaysia, a higher value
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of time encouraged an earlier marriage while in Japan a higher value of
time encouraged a later marriage; both effects were quite small.

However,

the responses to changes in male and female schooling and the husband's
wage were very similar in both countries; increases in the wife's schooling
and the husband's wage resulted in later marriage but increases in the husband's
schooling resulted in earlier marriage.

These similarities in response appear

even more significant given the cultural and developmental diversity between
Japan and Malaysia.
There is a significant upward time trend, in both countries.

For Malaysia,

however, this time tr~nd is much steeper than for Japan, with coefficients
of about 0.15 and 0.06 respectively.

This disparity may result

in part

from the very different pace at which these countries are undergoing economic
development.

Rapidly changing social attitudes toward single women may also

steepen this time trend in Malaysia relative to Japan.
Characteristics of the wife's background (available for Japan only)
increase the wife's age at marriage.

If her mother has accumulated human

capital or her father has a large income, income outside of marriage rises,
reducing the need to marry at an early age.

Rural residents experience later

ages at marriage than urban women, and Malay women experience later ages at
marriage than Chinese or Indian women (available for Malaysia only).
We conclude that an understanding of changing social conditions is
equally important in explaining marriage patterns as isolating an exogenous
time trend.

Increasing labor force participation of women and changing

attitudes towards the employment of married women have made alternatives
to marriage much more attractive.

We do agree with Hogan that participation

in time intensive activities--such as regular full-time employment--is a key

19

determinant of marriage but find his contention that family background can
be ignored as unsuitable among Japanese and Malaysian women.

Our results

also support the work of Keeley and Friedan; the value of time and the
availability of alternative income sources are crucial in determining changes
at age at marriage.
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APPENDIX
ESTIMATING WAGE A..~D INCOME VARIABLES

As discussed in the text, estimation of the marriage model requires
measures of the value of the wife's time, the value of the husband's time
and the female's transferred endowment as proxied by her fatheris income.
The procedure for measuring the lifetime value of the female's time takes
into consideration the censoring error of predicting a wage for all women
based only on the working sub-sample.

Since income information was reported

for the husband and the father only if they were the primary income earner,
we use instrumental variables predictions for these two income measures.

Each

predicting equation is discussed in turn.
WIFE'S WAGE

The measured market wage may understate the true value of time for
non-working women.

Hence the predicted value of the female's time is set

equal to an instrumental value of the market wage if they are working in the
paid labor force and to their predicted reservation wage if they are not
working in the paid labor force.

This procedure is based on work by Cogan

The lifetime .offered wage W is a function of each woman's level

(1975).

0

of schooling and her labor market experience:
W = f
0

0

(schooling, experience)

(A.1)

Following Mincer (1963), we define the experience variables as
Experience= Age - Schooling - 6.

(A.2)
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The reservation wage is defined as:
WR= fR (schooling, husband's income, family
business, home ownership).

(A. 3)

The choice to participate in the paid labor force in the current period
relies on a conparison of the reservation wage with the offered wage.
In order to estimate the parameters of the participation and wage functions,
we must first specify functional forms and stochastic structures:
(A.4)

lnWR = 8Rl + 8R2 Schooling+ 8R) husband's income+

8R 4

(A. 5)

family business+ SRS home ownership+ ER
where E and ER are independent and identically distributed Weibull errors.
0
The probability. of labor force participation (Pi) is then :
(A.6)

The parameters of the participation function may now be estimated with a
logit technique since ER - E has a logistic distribut_ion (McFadden (1975)).
0
Given the parameters of the market wage, estimated by OLS, we may then identify
the reservation wage function.

These estimates are presented in Table

A.l for Malaysia and A.2 for Japan.
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Table A.1.

Estimated Equations for Predicting the Value of Time:
.

(t~statistics in parentheses)

Independent
Variable

Means

Labor Force b 'c
Participation
-.824
(2.105)

Intercept
Years of Wife's
Schooling

3. 771

.0489
(1.947)

Years of Husband's
Schooling

5.709

-.026
(-1.442)

Wife's Experience

23.917

.066
(2. 352)

Wife's Experience
Squared

628.261

-.747D-03
(1. 362)

Unearned Wealth

390.703

.376D-05
( .134)

Family Business
Dummy
Home Products
Dummy
Urban Dummy

.337

Market Center
Dummy
Wife of Chinese
Origin Dummy
Wife of Indian
Origin Dummy

.011
.214
.197
.391
.117

2

X11
-log likelihood
F statistic

.439
(3.119)
.673
(.987)
-.906
(5.570)
-.997
(-5.558)
.217
(1.529j
.440
(2.136)
101.27
755.537

a

Sample size is 1170 households.

b

t-statistics are asymptotic

C

Fifty-four percent of all women are working.

Malaysia

a

Market
Wage
-.177
(.0705)
.142
(9. 913)

Reservation
Wage
.589

.096
.024

.062
(3.433)
-. 718D-03
(-2.078)
-.350D-05
-.378
-.625
.175
(1.688)
-.113
(-1.046)
.205
(2.321)

1.018

.431
(3.499)

.022

20.08

.814
.009
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Table A.2.

Estimated Equations for Predicting the Value of Time:

Japan

(t-statistics in parentheses) a

Independent
Variable

Means

Intercept

Labor Force b ' C
Participation
13.5054
(2.20)

Market
Wage

4.7038
{19.16)

Years of Schooling

10. 72

.01105
{.75)

.08528
{4.90)

Experience

19.60

.03092
(4. 03)

.003835
{1.05)

Reservation
Wage

2.9168
.08250

Home Ownership
Dummy

0.60

-.7538
(-4.39)

.09091

Family Business
Dummy

0.22

.7562
{-3.74)

.1291

ln Husband's Predicted 14.56
Income
x2
5

-log likelihood

-1.05

64.37
474.53

F-statistic

a

b

.1247

{-2 .4 7)

Sample size is 1110 households.
t-statistics are asymptotic

cFifteen percent of all women are working.

13.60
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HUSBAND'S INCOME
The predicting equation for the husband's income is based on a
linear model in which the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of
annual earnings, is regressed on three dummy variables indicating the
highest level of schooling which the husband completed, and a set of
dummy variables describing the husband's occupation.

Since the husband's

age is not reported, the wife's age serves as a proxy.

A dummy variable,

equal to one if the husband has ever been unemployed represents disruption
in work experience.

Table A.3 presents the results for Malaysia and

Table A.4 contains the results for Japan.

FATHER'S INCOME
The father's income is reported only for those Japanese women whose
fathers are the primary income earner.

Table A.5 presents the predicting

equation based on the available sample information .

The model for the

Japanese father is similar to that for the husband.

A variable equal

to one if the father completed college represents the father's schooling.
Dummy variables for seven occupationa l categories are also included.
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Table A.3.

Estimates for Predictin g the Husband's Value of Time:

Malaysia

(882 observati ons)

Independe nt
Variables

Means

Constant
Husband's Experienc e
Husband's Experienc e
Squared

27.217
883.92

Coefficie nt

t-statist ic

.876

5.164

.029

2.999

--000373

-2.360

Huband's Schooling

5. 776

.106

12.036

Husband of Chinese
Origin-Dummy

.384

.434

7.266

Husband of Indian
Origin-Dummy

.123

.164

1.920

Urban Dummy

.213

.382

5.473

.210

.405

5.481

Market Center
Dummy

F-statist ic
R-Square,

66.59
• 346
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Table A.4.

Estimate s for Predicti ng the Husgand 's Income:

Japan

(918 Observa tions)

Indepen dent
Variable s

Means

Intercep t

Coeffic ient

t-statis tic

13.9613

232.26

Ever unemploy ed (yes=l)

0.06

-0.1494

-2.91

High School

0.38

0.1558

4.88

Technic al School or
Junior College

0.11

0.2006

4 .31

College

0.24

0.3291

7.76

37.23

0.007744

5.59

Self-emp loyed

0.19

.3033

8.46

Profess ional

0.09

.1238

2.38

Manager

0.07

.4282

7.75

Salary man, large firm

0.16

.2125

5.n9

Salary man, ~mall firm

0.11

.1371

3.06

Blue collar, large firm

0.09

.07063

1.51

Wife's Age
Occupat ional Variable s

F-stati stic
R-square

29.34
.26
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Table A.5.

Estima tes for Predic ting the Father 's Income :

Japan

(72 Observ ations)

Indepe ndent
Variab les

Means

Interce pt

Coeffi cient

t-stati stic

14.9156

75.24

Colleg e

0.17

.1768

1.01

Farmer

0.14

-.5442

-2.25

Self-em ployed

0.24

-.09706

-0.45

Manage r

0.07

-.1705

-0.63

Salary man, large firm

0.14

-.3225

-1.42

Salary man, small firm

0.07

-.1919

-0.69

Blue collar , large· firm

0.11

-.3936

-1.57

Blue collar , small firm

0.15

-.6054

-2.55

F-stat istic
R-squa re

2.66
.25
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